Introduction
The relationship between optimal monetary policy and exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) has gained significant attention in theoretical and empirical research over the last decade.
Much of the interest has been driven by the apparent decline in the pass-through of exchange rate changes to domestic prices in low inflation environments (McCarthy (1999) , Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) , Bailliu and Fujii (2004) ) over the last two decades. To date, the literature on ERPT suggests that the risk to inflation of a depreciating domestic currency depends on how much of the falling value of the currency is passed through to import prices, and then to overall consumer prices. Taylor (2000) and Mishkin (2008) argue that a monetary stance that is sufficiently reactive to inflation can insulate consumer prices from the effects of a shock that causes the exchange rate to depreciate. They point out that ERPT is primarily a function of the persistence of exchange rate and price shocks, which tend to be reduced in an environment where inflation is low and monetary policy is more credible. Further, some of the implications of incomplete ERPT on monetary policy associated with the local currency pricing (Devereux and Engel (2002) , Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) , Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) ), sticky import price behavior (Smets and Wouters (2002) ) and the deviation from the law of one price (Monacelli (2005) ) have already been analyzed.
One feature that characterizes all the models discussed above is the assumption of a fully developed and perfectly open capital market. However, if we look at the Chinn-Ito capital openness indices (Chinn and Ito (2008) ) 1 for nine inflation targeting developed countries, (Table: 1) we realize that the assumption of perfect capital mobility holds for Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK, but not for Australia, Iceland, Israel, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of capital openness on exchange rate pass-through to domestic inflation in a flexible inflation targeting small open economy and assess the welfare implications of incomplete ERPT. Under flexible inflation targeting, the monetary authority adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate to stabilize inflation to its target level and the real economy, represented by the output-gap (Svensson (2000) , Taylor (2001) , Giannoni and Woodford (2003) , Walsh (2009) ). I focus inflation targeting small open economies because of the macroeconomic trilemma, which states that the monetary authority can choose at most two of the following three conditions,
• Autonomous monetary policy in the sense of different domestic and foreign interest rates
• A fixed exchange rate
• Perfect capital mobility
Because the goal of central banks following a flexible inflation targeting regime is the stabilization of domestic inflation and the output-gap, they need to be able to adjust domestic interest rates independent of foreign interest rates. For this reason, central banks need monetary independence. The developed IT countries gave up on a fixed exchange rate regime after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Therefore, it will be interesting to
investigate whether an open capital market helps them to anchor inflationary expectations more solidly, which in turn should lead to a low inflation environment and incomplete ERPT. Moreover, if capital openness affects the stabilization of inflation and the outputgap, it should have an impact on the social loss function, and this impact is worth exploring.
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions:
• Does the pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic inflation vary with the degree of capital openness?
• Phillips curve is obtained from the optimal price setting decisions of domestic producers.
Moreover, the exchange rate is introduced in terms of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. Taking into consideration the deviations from purchasing power parity, 3 it is assumed that the real exchange rate can vary over time, and the exchange rate pass-through is incomplete.
First I estimate the effect of capital market openness on exchange rate pass-through.
Then I impose parameter restrictions to the reduced form equations to examine how the inflation and output-gap trade-off and the social loss vary with capital openness.
The calibration results suggest that in the presence of capital controls, the inflation and output-gap trade-off deteriorates in the face of demand, cost-push and risk-premia shocks.
The deteriorating trade-off between inflation and the output-gap implies that the IT central bank has to suffer a greater loss in terms of a reduction in real activity when inflation is above its target rate. Since the primary objective of the IT central bank is to stabilize the deviation of inflation from its target and the output-gap, imposition of capital controls is welfare reducing. However, as the transmission of interest rate and risk-premia shocks to exchange rate declines in the presence of capital controls, the inflation output-gap trade-off and the social loss improves even in the presence of greater exchange rate pass-through.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the simple model of a small open economy. Section 3 empirically examines the effect of capital openness on the pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation and formulates the central bank's problem. Section 4 presents the calibration results and the estimation of social loss under a commitment strategy. Finally, section 5 describes the future research ideas and concludes.
Simple model of a small open economy
Here I use a simplified version of a small open economy model that is based on the reduced form equations from Monacelli (2005) , Walsh (2009) and Walsh (2010) 4 . This approach is consistent with Walsh (1999) .
The demand side of the economy is given by the following open economy forward looking IS equation:
where x is the output-gap, r is the real interest rate, e is the real exchange rate, E t denotes the market expectations based on the information at time t, and u is a demand shock that follows a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) given by
where ρ u > 0 and s t ∼ iid (0, σ 2 s ). In equation (2.1), the output-gap (x t ) depends negatively on the real interest rate, where the parameter σ (> 0) is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Also, x t depends positively on the expected future output-gap 5 and 4 Walsh (2010) : Monetary Theory and Policy, 3rd ed. Chapter 9. 5 Indicating that current aggregate demand is a function of expected future income.
on real depreciation. Taking the domestic currency as the numeraire, the real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of the foreign currency where an increase in e is given by a real depreciation of the domestic currency. Moreover, following the empirical evidence that purchasing power parity need not hold, this model assumes that the real exchange rate can vary. With a real depreciation, domestic products become cheaper relative to foreign products. Therefore, exports increase and imports fall, giving a boost to aggregate demand and output, and therefore, η y > 0.
The supply side of the economy is given by the New Keynesian open economy Phillips curve (NKPC),
where π is CPI (consumer price index) inflation, and π T is the inflation target set by the central bank, and t is a supply shock following a first order autoregressive (AR) process given by
where ρ > 0 and ω t ∼ iid (0, σ 2 ω ). In a sticky price model, the pricing decision of firms depends positively on real marginal costs, and therefore, the output-gap (=⇒ λ > 0) and the expected future inflation (=⇒ β > 0). Also, the deviation of inflation from its target level depends on the exchange rate depreciation, as the falling value of the currency puts upward pressure on import prices, and then is passed through to overall consumer prices
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, perfect capital substitutability and risk neutrality, the uncovered interest rate parity holds and is given by 7 E t e t+1 − e t = r t − r t * , where r is the domestic real interest rate, r * is the foreign real interest rate, and (E t e t+1 −e t )
is the expected real rate of depreciation. Interest rate parity suggests that the home interest rate on bonds, r, must equal the foreign interest rate r * , plus the expected real depreciation, (E t e t+1 − e t ). In other words, if home and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, and the international capital is fully mobile, the two bonds pay different interest rates only if agents expect that there will be a compensating movement in the exchange rate. However, the 6 Also known as exchange rate pass-through. 7 Assuming that the forward rate (Ft,t+1) is equal to the future spot rate (E e t+1 ).
empirical evidence in favor of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) is very weak. Therefore, I
relax the assumption of risk neutral agents and introduce a shock reflecting a risk-premium demanded by risk averse investors for foreign bonds. 8 Thus, the UIP condition is given by
where ζ t is an AR(1) risk-premium shock. 9
Since it is assumed that the country is small in world capital markets, it takes the foreign real interest rate, r * , as given. Also, the real interest rate is defined as 10
where i is the nominal interest rate (the central bank's policy instrument). All the variables, except inflation, are expressed in terms of their deviation from the respective steady state values where the steady state inflation is assumed to be π T . 11
Subsequently, following the standard literature, it is assumed that the monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function, which depends on the variability of inflation from its target and the output-gap, 12 subject to equations (2.1) through (2.3). Thus, the loss function (L) is the following:
The assumption of perfect capital mobility still holds. 9 ζt = ρ ζ ζt−1 + φ t where ρ ζ > 0 and φ t ∼ iid (0, σ 2 φ ). 10 From the Fisher's condition, the real interest rate (rt) can be written as, rt = it − Etπt+1. Also, the steady state real interest rate can be written as r ss = (r
The steady state values for the rest of the variables are assumed to be zero. 12 Under the assumption of flexible inflation targeting, the natural rate of output is assumed to be the implicit target for the actual output.
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3 Effect of capital openness on exchange rate pass-through and the UIP condition 3.1 Capital market openness and exchange rate pass-through
In this section, I empirically examine the effect of capital openness on ERPT, and to do that I use equation (2.2), the reduced form equation of the forward looking aggregate supply curve from section 2. However, in order to empirically examine this effect in the inflation targeting countries, I modify the aggregate supply curve. Instead of assuming a zero steady state for the real exchange rate, the real rate of depreciation is defined in the following way
where ∆s is the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its trend level, 13 π * is the world CPI inflation rate, and π is the domestic CPI inflation rate.
I include several control variables that have been found to be important determinants of inflation in the literature such as the output-gap (log difference between actual and trend 14 real GDP), and trade openness. In New Keynesian literature, a higher output-gap reflects higher cost of production (higher marginal cost), which in turn leads to increase in the prices, and as a result higher inflation. Moreover, Romer (1993) demonstrates that countries with greater trade openness experience lower average rates of inflation. He explains that an unanticipated monetary expansion causes exchange rate depreciation, and as this depreciation is greater in more open economies, the benefits of a surprise expansion are a decreasing function of the degree of trade openness. Therefore, the monetary authorities in a more open economy expand less and achieve lower average rates of inflation. 15
Since I use an interaction term between exchange rate deviation and capital openness in the regression equation, I also control for capital openness (ko) in order to avoid omitted variable bias. Therefore, the estimating equation is the following:
where j refers to the country, t refers to the time period, π is the rate of inflation, x is the output-gap, ∆e is the real exchange rate depreciation, E t denotes the market expectations based on information available at time t, ko is a measure of capital openness, to is a measure of trade openness, and it is an AR(1) supply shock. The CPI inflation target is assumed to be fixed at 2.5%, since the developed inflation targeting countries have a constant inflation target between 2-3%. Thus, I examine whether the ERPT in 8 IT developed countries, 16
Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK, has declined with a more open capital account. 17
Data description
The macroeconomic data set used in this estimation is taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM. The data set for each country begins when it started targeting inflation and extends through 2008Q4, 18 and the frequency of the data is quarterly.
The inflation variable used is the four-quarter log difference of CPI. Inflation deviation data is constructed by subtracting the monetary authority's target inflation rate (2.5%) from actual inflation. The world CPI inflation data is taken from the IMF's IFS CD-ROM.
Since, for most of the countries in the sample, data for their inflation forecasts is not available, I use actual one period lead inflation as a proxy for expected future inflation.
The output-gap is constructed by subtracting the real GDP trend (using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter 1600)) from actual real GDP for each country. The nominal exchange rate deviation is measured by the log difference of the nominal exchange rate with respect to US dollars from a smoothed series, which is constructed using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Moreover, the degree of trade openness is 16 Countries that have adopted IT until 2008 (central banks' websites) . 17 Israel is not included due to some data unavailability. 18 The date of the adoption of IT for each country is summarized in Table 1 .
9 calculated as the share of (imports + exports) in GDP .
The Chinn-Ito (2008) 
Estimation technique
To estimate exchange rate pass-through in the 8 IT countries either one of the two types of estimation techniques can be used, the time series estimation technique separately for 19 For the 8 IT developed countries, it ranges from 1.18 through 2.54. the 8 countries, or a dynamic panel regression. The time series analysis suffers from a limitation in this case. Since the study focuses on the period in which these countries have followed inflation targeting, its duration is not very long. As a result, there are only a small number of observations for each country, which may give biased estimates. However, this shortcoming can be addressed with a panel regression. The greater number of observations in a dynamic panel study will give more precise estimates. Also because this study focuses on inflation targeting developed countries rather than a random sample of a very large number of countries, the coefficients are expected to be similar. Moreover, the use of a panel regression will allow for the identification of country-specific effects in the estimation of the cross-country pass-through equation. Thus, to empirically estimate equation (3.1), I use a linear dynamic panel estimation technique. However, here two aspects need to be addressed. First, in this model, the problem of endogeneity can be expected to arise as the exchange rate and the output-gap are affected by the deviation of current inflation from its target. This endogeneity makes the estimation using pooled ordinary least squares inconsistent, and therefore, the equation needs to be estimated using instrumental variables (IV). Given the problem of endogeneity, the model can be estimated using the lagged values of output, inflation and exchange rate deviations as instruments. However, in this particular case, the number of instrumental variables and hence the orthogonality conditions will exceed the number of regressors, which will lead to over-identification. Hansen (1982) , in his seminal work, introduced the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation.
One important feature of the generalized methods of moments (GMM) is that it allows for more moment conditions than the number of parameters that need to be estimated, which means it allows the parameters to be over-identified and can obtain an optimal weighting matrix. Moreover, a GMM weighting matrix accounts for heteroskedasticity and the serial correlation of unknown form. Therefore, one way to estimate the model is by using a IV-GMM estimation technique. Second, in the presence of the autocorrelated error term, the use of lagged endogenous variables as instruments may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, in this case, an estimation technique is needed that can generate unbiased coefficient estimates in the presence of endogenous variables and autocorrelated errors in the presence of a lead dependent variable as a regressor. These requirements make both fixed and random effects panel estimation inconsistent.
To resolve this problem, I use a GMM estimation procedure developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . The speciality of this technique is that it can fit models with low order serial correlation in the disturbance terms or predetermined variables with a more complicated structure than allowed by the Arellano and Bond (1991) panel estimation technique. Moreover, it allows for unobserved country-specific effects (fixed or random) to be correlated with the explanatory variables. To better illustrate this point, considering a dynamic panel model in a more general form:
where η reflects the serially uncorrelated measurement errors in the construction of the output-gap or exchange rate deviations or institutional preferences, and ν is the error term that follows the following AR(1) process
where ρ > 0 and j,t ∼ (0, σ 2 ). It is assumed that n i,t and x i,t are potentially correlated with η j,t , and with j,t . Further, we are interested in the consistent estimates of the parameters (β n and β x ).
This model has a dynamic representation such that y j,t − ρy j,t−1 = β n n j,t − ρβ n n j,t−1 + β x x j,t − ρβ x x j,t−1 + η j,t − ρη j,t−1 + ν j,t − ρν j,t−1 =⇒ y j,t = γ 1 n j,t + γ 2 n j,t−1 + γ 3 x j,t + γ 4 x j,t−1 + γ 5 y i,t−1 + w i,t , (3.4) subject to two linear restrictions: γ 2 = −γ 1 γ 5 and γ 4 = −γ 3 γ 5 . Here, w j,t = j,t ∼ M A(0) if there are no measurement errors, and w j,t ∼ M A(1) otherwise. According to Blundell and Bond (1998) , if we are willing to assume that E(∆n j,t−s * w j,t ) = E(∆x j,t−s * w j,t ) = 0 for s = 1 when w j,t ∼ M A(0), and for s = 2 when w j,t ∼ M A(1), this allows the use of suitably lagged first differences of the variables as instruments for the equations in levels. The linear dynamic panel estimation used in this paper fits the Blundell and Bond system estimator.
Moreover, it can fit a model where the lagged dependent variable is not a regressor, and the error term follows a low-order MA process (so the no-measurement-error assumption is not required). Thus, 2 lags of the output-gap and 2 lags of exchange rate deviations are used for differenced equations and level equations, respectively. Consequently, the Blundell and
Bond estimator constructs a large instrument matrix based on the instruments specified, and a GMM estimator. Moreover, the presence of endogeneity makes use of the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator relevant because it accommodates the situation in which more than one explanatory variable is assumed to be endogenous.
Results from the Blundell and Bond dynamic panel estimation
In this section, I present the results of the Blundell and Bond panel estimation. They capture how the cross-country ERPT changes depending on the openness of the capital market. The estimating equation is the following:
(π j,t − π T ) = α j + β 1 (E t π j,t+1 − π T ) + β 2 x j,t + β 3 ∆e j,t + β 4 (∆e j,t * ko j,t ) + β 5 ko j,t +β 6 to j,t + j,t .
(3.5) from the panel estimation suggest that higher expected inflation puts upward pressure on current inflation, as indicated by a value for β 1 that is significantly different from zero and positive. In optimal monetary policy analysis, the coefficient attached to expected future inflation, β 1 , is assumed to be greater than 0.9 in equation (3.5). 21 However, the empirical analysis suggests that it is close to 0.2. This could be due to the fact that the actual lead inflation (π t+1 ) is used as a proxy for expected future inflation, E t π t+1 , since the data for the forecast inflation is not available. Furthermore, a higher marginal cost of production (reflected in the output-gap) also increases inflation, β 2 > 0. On the other hand, higher capital mobility significantly reduces inflation as β 5 < 0. Moreover, real depreciation puts upward pressure on inflation, as β 3 > 0. However, the positive effect of real depreciation on inflation falls significantly with greater capital openness, as the coefficient on (∆e j,t * ko j,t ), β 4 , is significantly less than zero. The marginal effect of real depreciation on inflation is given by (β 3 + β 4 * ko), indicating that the effect of real depreciation on inflation depends on the level of capital openness.
20 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%
21 Coefficient β in the theoretical part. Since the capital openness index is variable over time, the effect of capital openness on ERPT is shown in Figure 1 along with the Chinn-Ito capital openness index. The solid line in the middle shows the effect of capital openness on ERPT (β 3 + β 4 * ko), and the two lines on either side of the solid line show the 95% confidence interval. The 95% confidence interval around the solid line allows us to determine the conditions under which capital openness has a statistically significant effect on ERPT. From the figure it is evident that the marginal effect of exchange rate depreciation on inflation is declining; as capital openness rises, however, it remains positive.
To explain the decline in ERPT in a low inflation environment, Taylor (2000) in a monopolistically competitive environment, the pricing power and the persistence of costs are directly related. Therefore, low inflation may be associated with less persistent changes in costs, and lower persistence of costs will result in smaller pass-through. In line with Taylor's argument, the Bank of Canada reports that when inflation is low, and the central bank's commitment to keeping it low is highly credible, firms are less inclined to quickly pass higher costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices, which in turn generates a low ERPT (Bank of Canada (2000)). In this paper, the decline in ERPT in the presence of perfect capital mobility can be due to the fact that for an inflation targeting
country, an open capital market makes the commitment to a nominal anchor (inflation for IT countries) stronger and indicates a more stable monetary policy. This in turn leads to a low inflation environment and incomplete ERPT.
Moreover, although (Terra (1998) ) points out that the negative relationship between trade openness and inflation is generated mainly for severely indebted countries, I find a significantly negative relationship between trade openness and inflation for developed countries, confirming Romer's (1993) prediction that monetary authorities in more open economies expand less, as the harm of a real depreciation is greater in those countries, and they experience lower average rates of inflation as a result.
Capital market imperfections and the interest rate parity condition
In the presence of capital controls, interest parity does not hold anymore. Aliber (1973) explains the departure from interest rate parity in terms of the rise in risk-premia in the presence of capital controls due to the exchange risk and the political risk. Dooley and Isard (1980) provide empirical evidence for this claim using the DM/dollar rate. 22 Aliber (1973) argues that capital controls can be imposed by offering less stringent terms on the forward contract relative to the spot contract. This type of control can generate exchange risk because speculators can buy an unlimited volume of the forward contract, but they cannot do the same for the spot market. Also, Aliber (1973) points out that a political risk may arise from differences in political jurisdiction, which can be explained by the probability that the authority might apply capital controls. 23 Moreover, in the presence of capital controls, a shock to the domestic interest rate will not be fully transmitted to exchange rate deviations. 24 Therefore, with limited capital openness the UIP is the following:
γ (E t e t+1 − e t ) = r t − r t * − ζ t , (3.6) where ζ t is the AR(1) risk-premium shock 25 and γ > 1.
22 These risk-premia apply in addition to the risk-premium charged by risk averse domestic agents on the foreign bonds.
23 In this case, following Aliber (1973) , and Dooley and Isard (1980) , an effect on the level of risk-premia is considered and not on its volatility.
24 Considering that the capital controls would be imposed to insulate exchange rate fluctuation from the interest rate shocks.
25 ζ t = ρ ζ ζ t−1 + φ t where ρ ζ > 0 and φ t ∼ iid (0, σ 2 φ ).
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The central bank's problem
The problem of the central bank can be written as:
Subject to,
where η π > η π , γ > 1, and ζ t denotes the exchange plus political risk-premia shocks following an AR(1) process:
where ρ ζ > 0, and φ t ∼ iid (0, σ 2 φ ). The Lagrangian is of the following form:
Also, we have the demand shock, the cost-push shock and the risk-premia shocks following the respective AR(1) processes with independent innovations:
For simplicity, assuming the foreign interest rate, i * t , and the deviation of foreign expected inflation from its target (E t π t+1 − π T ) * ) are equal to zero, the shock processes ((3.12)-(3.14) and the first-order conditions from the Lagrangian (3.11) can be written in the following state-space form: 
Premultiplying the system with the inverse of C we can write the system in the following way,
Moreover, i is the policy instrument to minimize the objective function that can be expressed as 
Following numerical methods developed by Soderlind (1999) , the endogenous variables, x t , (π t − π T ) and e t are obtained in terms of the shocks (u t , t , ζ t ). Moreover, the social loss is calculated from equation (3.16).
Welfare implications of capital market imperfections under commitment
In this section, I present some quantitative results based on a calibrated version of the small open economy. The unknown parameters in the model are β, α, σ, λ,, η y , η π , η π and γ.
The parameter values are standard and most of them are taken from Gali and Monacelli (2005) . 27 The discount factor β = 0.99, implying a steady state interest rate of i = 0.01 at a quarterly rate. 28 The weight on the output-gap in the central bank's loss function (α) is set at 0.25. Parameter σ, which is the inverse of the coefficient of risk aversion, is assumed to be 1. Parameter λ, which captures the effect of the output-gap on inflation, is set at 0.05. η y is calculated using the values of structural parameters from the small open economy model of Gali and Monacelli (2005) , where η y = 0.4. It is assumed that the passthrough parameter η π varies between 0 (no pass-through) and 1 (complete pass-through)
where the value of η π rises with capital market imperfections. The coefficient attached to expected real depreciation, γ, in the UIP condition is set equal to one in the presence of perfect capital mobility such that the UIP represents the typical UIP condition for a small open economy. However, in the presence of limited capital openness γ > 1 and it is set at 1.5, implying that when capital controls are in place and effective, interest rate changes 27 The model is calibrated on a quarterly basis. 28 The interest rate is 4%per annum.
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will not be transmitted entirely to the exchange rate.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the response of an inflation deviation (π t − π T ), the outputgap (x t ) and the real exchange rate (e t ) to a positive and temporary (ρ u = 0) aggregate demand shock, a cost-push shock (ρ = 0) and risk-premia shocks (ρ ζ = 0). Following the empirical evidence in section 3.1, the pass-through coefficient (η π ) rises with capital market imperfections, and here I have plotted the impulse responses for η π = 0.2 and η π = 0.4.
Further, to assess the effect of γ on the impulse response functions, I compare two cases, γ = 1 and γ = 1.5 where η π is set at 0.4. Figure 2 shows the responses of an inflation deviation (π t − π T ), the output-gap (x t ) and the real exchange rate (e t ) to a temporary (ρ u = 0) aggregate demand shock. The positive demand shock increases the output-gap and requires monetary tightening. The rise in the interest rate causes the exchange rate to appreciate making imports cheaper, and as a result, inflation declines below its target level. However, clearly the deflation required to bring output back to its trend level rises with capital market imperfections.
One interesting aspect of the impulse response function is that although the demand shock is temporary, the figure shows a strong positive correlation in the output-gap over time under commitment. Figure 3 displays the impact of a temporary cost-push shock on (π t − π T ), x t and e t .
In response to a positive cost-push shock, the production cost increases, and as a result, inflation rises above its target. The central bank finds it optimal to engineer a temporary reduction in the output-gap, thus dampening the effect of the shock on inflation. Also, due to the rise in domestic prices, the real exchange rate appreciates. To stabilize prices, the central bank raises the interest rate, and the rise in the interest rate is greater in the presence of greater capital openness (smaller pass-through). One interpretation for this could be that under an inflation targeting framework, greater capital openness makes the central bank's commitment to stabilizing inflation more credible. This in turn leads to a greater response of the nominal interest rate in the face of a cost-push shock. Moreover, it is evident from figure 3 that the output loss required to bring inflation to its target is greater in the presence of capital market imperfections, suggesting a deterioration in the inflation output-gap trade-off in the presence of capital market imperfections. Figure 4 presents the effect of positive and temporary risk-premia shocks on (π t − π T ),
x t and e t . Positive risk-premia shocks cause the exchange rate to depreciate, and therefore raise inflation. The pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation is more complete with 20 limited capital openness, and consequently, the rise in inflation is greater when η π = 0.4, compared to when η π = 0.2. In response to a real depreciation, the central bank raises the interest rate. However, limited capital openness leads to a greater interest rate response to positive risk-premia shocks. This could be due to the fact that in the presence of capital market imperfections, the pass-through rate is greater, which raises inflation more when there is a depreciation resulting from a positive risk-premium shock. As a result, the monetary authority raises the interest rate more to influence the exchange rate. The behavior of macroeconomic variables in response to the risk-premia shocks in turn indicates that in an inflation targeting environment, the central bank has less control over exchange rates in the presence of greater capital openness. Further, in the face of risk-premia shocks, greater output loss is needed to reduce inflation to its target level in the presence of capital controls.
Further, I plot the impulse response functions of (π t − π T ), x t and e t for γ > 1, keeping η π = 0.4 and compare these to those when γ = 1, in response to demand, cost-push and risk-premia shocks, respectively. This reduced reaction of the real exchange rate to macroeconomic shocks improves the inflation output-gap trade-off and reduces social loss.
The social loss calculated from equation (3.16) (for different values of η π and γ) is summarized in Table 4 . The top two rows in Table 4 describe the parameter values of β, σ, η y , α and λ and the persistence parameters ρ u , ρ and ρ ζ . The first column presents the values of η π , which vary from 0.00 (no pass-through) to 1.00 (complete pass-through).
The second and third columns denote the coefficient γ, which is attached to the exchange rate deviation in the UIP condition. First, γ is set to 1 and then to 1.5, indicating that the variation in the interest rate is first transmitted entirely and then only partially to exchange rate deviations. The conjecture is that in the presence of perfect capital mobility there is a one-to-one relation between exchange rate deviation and the interest rate through the UIP condition, and therefore, γ = 1. However, when capital controls are effectively in place, they would insulate the exchange rate deviations from the interest rate fluctuations, and consequently γ > 1. Fourth and fifth columns present the values of the central bank's loss function for corresponding values of η π and γ.
The values of the parameters and the central bank's loss function in Table 4 suggest that as the ERPT rises with capital market imperfections, keeping everything else unchanged, social loss rises under commitment, implying that a greater pass-through is welfare reducing under a commitment strategy. However, as the value of γ is set to greater than one in the presence of limited capital openness, the social loss rises with greater pass-through, but is less than in previous respective cases, when γ was kept constant at one. 29 Thus, when capital controls are in place and effective in the sense that they can insulate the exchange rate from the fluctuations in interest rates, then even in the presence of large exchange rate pass-through, social loss can be reduced. Using a forward looking New Keynesian model, I find that in the presence of imperfect capital mobility, the exchange rate pass-through to inflation increases and the uncovered interest parity condition does not hold. Under reasonable parameter values drawn from the recent literature, the calibration results show that with limited capital openness, these two effects raise the marginal cost of an inflation deviation from its target, and lead to a deterioration of the inflation output-gap trade-off in the face of demand, cost-push and risk-premia shocks. Also, with limited capital openness, the nominal interest rate response to positive demand (increases the output-gap) and cost-push shocks (raises inflation above its target) are less, while the response to the risk-premia shocks (cause exchange rate depreciation) are greater in magnitude. Further, the social loss under an optimal commitment policy rises with greater exchange rate pass-through. However, the social loss can be reduced by insulating the exchange rate deviations from the transmission of interest rate shocks.
The implication of these findings is that under an optimal commitment strategy, an inflation targeting country has to suffer greater loss in terms of real activity to keep inflation at its target in the presence of capital controls, and thus imposing capital controls when the country is targeting inflation is welfare reducing. For example, when an inflation targeting economy experiences a positive risk-premium shock, the exchange rate depreciates. Due to a greater pass-through from exchange rates to inflation in the presence of an imperfect capital market, inflation rises more. Consequently, the central bank suffers from a larger output loss to bring the inflation back to its target. As a result, the social loss in the presence of capital market restrictions rises. However, if the capital controls are effective at reducing the transmission of interest rate and risk-premia shocks to the real exchange rate, then the social loss can be reduced even in the presence of greater exchange rate pass-through. Also, under an inflation targeting framework, limited capital openness makes the central bank's commitment of inflation stabilization less credible and reduces the interest rate response in the face of cost-push shocks. At the same time, greater capital mobility (limited capital mobility) leads to a lower (greater) response of the interest rate to riskpremia shocks that directly affect the exchange rate, indicating that under an inflation targeting framework a central bank has less (greater) control over exchange rate movements in the presence of greater (limited) capital openness.
For future research, one interesting extension would involve examining the effect of a time-varying inflation target on the model instead of assuming a constant inflation target.
Such an extension will help to incorporate developing countries into the empirical analysis.
Finally, it is worth noting that this paper allows for incomplete exchange rate pass-through to inflation. Some of the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass-through on monetary policy associated with the local currency pricing (Devereux and Engel (2002), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) , Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) ) and the deviation from the law of one price (Monacelli (2005) ) have already been analyzed. At the same time, from the empirical study in this paper (section 3.1), it is evident that monetary policy also affects the level of exchange rate pass-through by anchoring inflation expectations more solidly with greater openness of the capital market. Therefore, it would be interesting to further explore the implications of alternative monetary policies on ERPT in the presence of capital market imperfections. 
